Raccoon Attack: Finding and Exploiting Most-Significant-Bit-Oracles in TLS-DH(E)

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Abstract

Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DHKE) is a widely adopted method for exchanging cryptographic key material in real-world protocols like TLS-DH(E). Past attacks on TLS-DH(E) focused on weak parameter choices or missing parameter validation. The confidentiality of the computed DH share, the premaster secret, was never questioned; DHKE is used as a generic method to avoid the security pitfalls of TLS-RSA.

We show that due to a subtle issue in the key derivation of all TLS-DH(E) cipher suites in versions up to TLS 1.2, the premaster secret of a TLS-DH(E) session may, under certain circumstances, be leaked to an adversary. Our main result is a novel side-channel attack, named Raccoon attack, which exploits a timing vulnerability in TLS-DH(E), leaking the most significant bits of the shared Diffie-Hellman secret. The root cause for this side channel is that the TLS standard encourages non-constant-time processing of the DH secret. If the server reuses ephemeral keys, this side channel may allow an attacker to recover the premaster secret by solving an instance of the Hidden Number Problem. The Raccoon attack takes advantage of uncommon DH modulus sizes, which depend on the properties of the used hash functions. We describe a fully feasible remote attack against an otherwise-secure TLS configuration: OpenSSL with a 1032-bit DH modulus. Fortunately, such moduli are not commonly used on the Internet.

Furthermore, with our large-scale scans we have identified implementation-level issues in production-grade TLS implementations that allow for executing the same attack by directly observing the contents of server responses, without resorting to timing measurements.

1 Introduction

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange. In Diffie-Hellman (DH) Key Exchange, a client A and a server B both use a prime \( p \) and a generator \( g \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) as public parameters, where \( g \) generates a cyclic subgroup \( G \leq \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) of prime order \( q \). B chooses a secret \( b \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and A chooses a secret \( a \in \mathbb{Z}_q \). B sends the DH “share” \( g^b \mod p \) to A, while A sends its share \( g^a \mod p \) to B. Both parties can then compute \((g^a)^b = (g^b)^a = g^{ab} \mod p\). If the parameters \( p \) and \( q \) are chosen in such a way that the Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption (CDH) holds for \( G \), a third party that observes the transmitted values \( g^a, g^b \mod p \) cannot compute this shared secret \( g^{ab} \).

TLS-DH(E). Transport Layer Security (TLS) relies on the DH assumption and adapts the DH key exchange to compute a shared key \((g^a)^b\) between a client and a server. The shared key is used as a premaster secret to derive all necessary cryptographic material for the established connection. In practice, TLS peers can use two DH key exchange types: TLS-DH and TLS-DHE. In a TLS-DH connection, the server uses a static value \( b \). In TLS-DHE, the server uses an ephemeral value \( b \).

Side-channel attacks against TLS. Due to its importance, the TLS protocol was subject to many cryptographic analyses, including the security of the TLS handshake structure [14] and TLS-DHE [36]. These analyses confirm the security of the design of TLS, which is essential for its implementation and deployment. However, models used in these studies rely on specific assumptions and implementation correctness. For
example, they assume that the secret-processing functions work in constant time and do not leak any confidential data. Such behavior is not always given in practice and can be practically exploited by an attacker using specific side channels.

A typical example of side-channel attacks are timing attacks. In timing attacks, an attacker measures the response time of an implementation to recover secret information. There are numerous examples of timing side-channel attacks that have been successfully applied to TLS. Brumley and Boneh [20] showed how to recover the private key of a TLS-RSA server by measuring timing differences in arithmetic optimizations for different ciphertext lengths. AlFardan and Paterson [6] were able to recover plaintext bytes from the TLS Record Layer by observing subtle timing differences in the computation of the HMAC. Meyer et al. [47] constructed a Bleichenbacher oracle from timing differences in the handling of valid and invalid PKCS#1 encoded premaster secrets within the ClientKeyExchange message.

The standard strategy for preventing timing attacks is to make implementations constant time, i.e., the implementation’s processing time should always be the same, regardless of any conditions on the secret. Deploying such a countermeasure can be very challenging, especially if the side channel results from the behavior described in the protocol specification. For example, the Lucky 13 attack by AlFardan and Paterson resulted from the failure in the TLS specification to process ciphertext in constant time [6]. While the paper describes concrete countermeasure strategies, we could observe several resurrections of this attack in recent years [4, 8, 58].

A timing oracle in the TLS-DH(E) KDF. We start our study with the critical observation that the TLS specification prescribes variable-length secrets as input to the key derivation function (KDF); all TLS versions up to version 1.2 mandate that the DH premaster secret must be stripped of leading zero bytes before it is used to derive connection secrets. Since the first step of the KDF is to apply a hash function to the secret, this hash calculation will use less internal iterations if a critical number of leading zeros has been stripped. For example, for SHA-384 (cf. Table 1), the internal block size is 128 bytes. Due to the structure of the length and padding fields used in SHA-384, the last hash input block can contain up to 111 bytes. Therefore, inputs with up to 239=128+111 bytes will be processed in two blocks. For inputs with 240 bytes and more, at least three hash blocks are necessary.

Processing an additional hash block results in an additional hash compression computation. Therefore, for some DH modulus sizes, the KDF is faster for premaster secrets with leading zero bytes, since these zero bytes will be stripped. If an attacker can use precise timing measurements to learn the number of hash compressions performed on the premaster secret, the attacker is also able to learn some leading bits of the premaster secret. This behavior allows the attacker to create a most significant bits (MSBs) oracle from a server and to determine the MSBs of the DH secret.

The Hidden Number Problem. In 1996, Boneh and Venkatesan presented the Hidden Number Problem (HNP) [17], originally to show that using the most significant bits (MSB) of a Diffie-Hellman secret is as secure as using the full secret. Their proof includes an algorithm that, given an oracle for the MSBs of DH shared secrets where one side of the key exchange is fixed, computes the entire secret for another such key exchange. The algorithm presented in that seminal work uses basis reduction in lattices to efficiently solve the Closest Vector Problem. While initially presented as part of a positive security result, the HNP and its solutions later were also used as components in cryptographic attacks. For example, such algorithms have been used to break DSA, ECDSA, and qDSA with biased or partially known nonces [9, 11, 18, 24, 49–51, 63].

Perhaps surprisingly, the original target of the HNP, Diffie-Hellman key exchange, remained unattacked until now. We close this gap by presenting the first full HNP-based attack on Diffie-Hellman key exchange as implemented in TLS-DH(E).

Raccoon attack. The Raccoon attack can recover TLS-DH(E) premaster secrets from passively-observed TLS-DH(E) sessions by exploiting a side channel in the server and solving the Hidden Number Problem using lattice reduction algorithms. The attack requires that the server reuses the same Diffie-Hellman share across sessions, which is the case for a server with static TLS-DH or a server reusing ephemeral keys in TLS-DHE [62].

On a high level, the attack works as follows (cf. Figure 1):

1. The attacker records the TLS handshake, including both the client DH share $g^a$ and the server share $g^b$.
2. The attacker initiates new handshakes to the same server (therefore with the same $g^b$), using $g^{a_i} \cdot g^a$ for some randomly chosen $r_i$. The premaster secret for these new sessions is $(g^{a_i} \cdot g^a)^b = g^{ab}$. The attacker can compute the first term, and the second term is the targeted DH secret.
3. For each handshake, the attacker measures the response time of the server. For some modulus sizes, DH secrets with leading zeroes will result in a faster server KDF computation, and hence a shorter server response time.
4. Assume temporarily that the attacker can perfectly detect the above case. Each such case can be converted to an equation in the Hidden Number Problem. When a sufficient number of equations has been determined, the HNP can be solved to calculate $g^a$, the secret Diffie-Hellman value of the original handshake. The attacker can then decrypt the original TLS traffic to recover its plaintext.

Contributions. We make the following contributions:

- We present a novel side channel, stemming from the TLS-DH(E) standard, that leaks the value of some most significant bits of a DH shared secret.
• We demonstrate that this side channel can be exploited remotely, allowing an adversary to decrypt TLS traffic. More broadly, our findings serve as another example of the dangers of computations in cryptography that are not constant-time, which are relevant to cryptographic protocols beyond TLS.

• We perform large-scale scans of the most prominent servers on the Internet to estimate the impact of the vulnerability. Interestingly, with our scans, we were able to find servers presenting different behavior based on the first byte of the premaster secret; this allowed us to construct a direct form of our Raccoon attack.

• We report the first attack targeting finite-field Diffie-Hellman using the Hidden Number Problem as a crypt-analytic tool.

Responsible Disclosure. We responsibly disclosed our findings to large server operators, major TLS implementations, the IETF, and our national CERT. F5 assigned the issue CVE-2020-5929. In particular, several F5 products enjoy a special version of the attack, without the need for precise timing measurements. OpenSSL assigned the issue CVE-2020-1968. OpenSSL uses fresh DH keys per default since version 1.0.2f from 2016. To further mitigate the attack, OpenSSL moved all remaining DH cipher suites to the weak ciphers list. In addition, motivated by this research, the developers also switched to fresh generation of EC ephemeral keys in OpenSSL 1.0.2w (these keys were previously long-lived). Mozilla assigned the issue CVE-2020-12413. It has been solved by disabling DH and DHE cipher suites in Firefox (which was already planned before our report). Microsoft assigned the issue CVE-2020-1596. BearSSL and BoringSSL are not affected because they do not support DH(E) cipher suites. Botan, Mbed TLS, WolfSSL and s2n do not support static DH cipher suites. Their DHE cipher suites never reuse ephemeral keys.

Artifacts Availability. The code that was used in this work is available under an Open Source license at https://github.com/tls-attacker/raccoon-code.

2 Background

Here we provide a description of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) handshake protocol and its key derivations.

2.1 Transport Layer Security (TLS)

The TLS protocol (previously known as SSL) provides confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity to many common applications on the Internet. The latest version of the protocol is TLS 1.3 [56], while the older versions TLS 1.0, 1.1, and 1.2 [27–29] are currently still deployed alongside of it. The older versions SSLv3 and SSLv2 are considered to be insecure. SSLv3 and TLS versions 1.0 to 1.2 all share a similar structure, while TLS 1.3 overhauled the design of the protocol and is fundamentally different from the previous versions. In this work, we focus on SSLv3 and TLS versions 1.0 to 1.2.

The TLS protocol structure consists of two phases. In the first phase, called the handshake, the client and server negotiate the cryptographic algorithms and establish session keys. In the second phase, the peers can securely send and receive application data using the record protocol, which is encrypted and authenticated using the keys and algorithms established in the previous phase.

The aforementioned choice of cryptographic algorithms is called a TLS cipher suite [29]. More precisely, a cipher suite is a concrete selection of algorithms for all of the required cryptographic tasks. For example, the cipher suite TLS-DHE-RSA-WITH-AES-128-CBC-SHA uses ephemeral DH key exchange and RSA signatures over server DH shares in order to establish a shared session key. In order to encrypt and authenticate data, it uses symmetric AES-CBC encryption with a 128-bit key and HMACs based on SHA-1.

In the following, we focus on cipher suites using DH(E) as the key exchange method. To establish a TLS connection, the client sends an SSLv3 or TLSv1 ClientHello message, which contains a client certificate and other TLS features, which should be used in this session. The server follows this message up with a Certificate message, which contains a server certificate, the supported cipher suites, the supported version(s), and TLS features, as well as a nonce (called serverRandom). The server responds to this with a ServerHello, containing a selected cipher suite and version, a nonce (called serverRandom), as well as other TLS features, which should be used in this session. The server follows this message up with a ClientHello message, which contains an X.509 certificate of the server. In static-DH cipher suites, this certificate contains a long-lived Diffie-Hellman public key \((g, p, g^b \mod p)\), while in TLS-DHE cipher suites the certificate contains an RSA or DSA public signature key. If a DHE cipher suite is selected, the server sends a server key exchange message, containing the ephemeral public DH key \((g, p, g^b \mod p)\), as well as a signature, generated with the private key corresponding to the server’s certificate. The server then sends a ServerHelloDone message, which signals to the client that the server has finished sending this flight of messages. The client then sends a ClientKeyExchange message, containing the client public key \(g^a\). Both parties now have the cryptographic material to compute a shared secret called the premaster secret (PMS) as \(g^{ab} = (g^a)^b = (g^b)^a \mod p\). The PMS is then used to derive the master secret using a key derivation function (which we describe below); the master secret is used to derive the individual symmetric keys. The client then sends a ChangeCipherSpec message, indicating to the server that the following messages sent from the client to the server will be encrypted. The last message sent by the client within the handshake is a Finished message, which contains a cryptographic checksum over the transcript of the connection. The server answers this with its own ChangeCipherSpec.
message, indicating that from now on, all messages are encrypted, followed by the server’s Finished message.

2.2 Hash Functions

Hash functions are mappings \( h : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^N \) which are one-way, collision-free and do not allow to compute second preimages [25]. A real-world hash function with close to unbounded input length cannot be evaluated in constant time; rather, for any reasonable implementation, the running time for an input of length \( k \) is \( O(k) \). This can result in a timing side channel in real-world applications if the hash function is used with secret inputs of varying lengths [6]. Most common cryptographic hash functions are built using a Merkle-Damgård construction [25]. In this construction, the input is split into fixed-size blocks, and each block is mixed into a state of the computation using a compression function, until all blocks have been processed. Prior to feeding the blocks to the compression function, the input is extended by a length field, and then padded to a multiple of the block size of the hash function; the extension and padding may necessitate creating an additional input block. In some constructions, the output is fed to a finalization function, which compresses the internal state to the final output.

![Figure 2: Merkle-Damgård construction of common hash functions, such as MD5, SHA-1 and SHA-256.](image)

Table 1 gives an overview of hash functions relevant to this work. The second and third columns indicate the input and output block size, respectively. The fourth column provides the minimum number of bytes appended to the input. For example, when using SHA-256 (which uses a block size of 64 bytes), at least 9 bytes have to be appended to the input message. Therefore, messages of up to 55 bytes will be processed as one block, using two calls to the compression function (due to the finalization function). Messages of length between 56 and 128 – 9 = 119 bytes will be processed as two input blocks, using three calls to the compression function. Table 1 provides further examples for input block boundaries.

### Table 1: Properties of common hash functions. The second and third columns indicate the input and output block sizes. The fourth column indicates the minimum size of the length field and padding in the last block. The last column indicates the maximum input sizes fitting into one, two, and three blocks, respectively. All values are denoted in bytes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hash function</th>
<th>Input block size</th>
<th>Output size</th>
<th>Length and padding</th>
<th>Input block borders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MD5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8+1</td>
<td>55, 119, 183, ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-1</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8+1</td>
<td>55, 119, 183, ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>8+1</td>
<td>55, 119, 183, ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-384</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>16+1</td>
<td>111, 239, 367, ...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fourth column indicates the minimum size of the length field and padding in the last block. The last column indicates the maximum input sizes fitting into one, two, and three blocks, respectively. All values are denoted in bytes.

which then arbitrary many pseudorandom bytes are derived. TLS (and other typical cryptographic protocols) use a KDF based on HMAC [42].

HMAC is a mechanism to compute message authentication codes based on hash functions. The HMAC can be instantiated with any hash function \( H \) and then inherits the parameters of this function. For example, HMAC-SHA1 has an internal block size of 64 bytes and an output size of 20 bytes.

\[
\text{HMAC}_H(K, M) = H((K \oplus \text{opad}) || H((K \oplus \text{ipad}) || M))
\]

Here \( K \) is a secret key, and \( \text{opad} \) and \( \text{ipad} \) are byte arrays of hash input block size \( B \) filled with bytes 0x36 and 0x5C, respectively. The secret key \( K \) must also have a fixed length \( B \). Therefore, before computing the HMAC, \( K \) is either padded with zeros (if \( |K| < B \)) or hashed with the hash function \( H \) (if \( |K| > B \)). This additional hash function invocation on the secret key \( K \) can result in measurable timing differences.

HMAC provides a foundational mechanism to design a pseudorandom function (PRF) for key derivation and key expansion. The PRF in TLS uses a single hash function \( H \), a secret \( K \), a label, and a seed to expand cryptographic material [29]:

\[
\text{PRF}(K, \text{label}, \text{seed}) = \text{HMAC}_H(K, A_1 || \text{label} || \text{seed}) || \text{HMAC}_H(K, A_2 || \text{label} || \text{seed}) || \text{HMAC}_H(K, A_3 || \text{label} || \text{seed}) || \ldots
\]

where \( A_0 = \text{label} || \text{seed} \) and \( A_i = \text{HMAC}_H(K, A_{i-1}) \). Here the \text{label} is a distinguishing ASCII string constant defined in the TLS standard. The number of PRF iterations depends on the desired output length. For example, three iterations can be used to produce up to 96 output bytes if SHA-256 is used.

2.3 Key Derivation

Modern DHKE based protocols do not use the shared cryptographic secret \( K = g^{ab} \) (or parts of it) directly as the key to symmetric algorithms. Instead, \( K \) is used as the input to a KDF which uses a fixed-size intermediate value seed, from

2.4 The Hidden Number Problem

To solve the Hidden Number Problem (HNP) [17], an adversary must compute a secret integer \( d \) (in our case the premaster secret of the TLS-DHE session under attack) modulo a public prime \( p \) with bit-size \( n \), given information about the
3 Raccoon Length Distinguishing Oracles

In this section we describe length distinguishing side channel oracles which may be used in the Raccoon attack. All of these oracles exploit the following fact:

The key derivation function KDF strips leading zeros from the computed DH secret \( g^{ab} \) and performs further computations based on the modified secret string.

These computations can result in different timing behaviors based on the number of removed bits or different error behavior. An attacker observing the timing behavior can construct an oracle from the behavior of an application using Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and use it to leak some of the most significant bits (MSB) of the shared secret. This already invalidates the standard indistinguishability assumption of the cryptographic primitives used (DDH, PRF-ODH).

We define \( O_{k,b}(x) \) as an oracle that reveals if the \( k \) most significant bits of the \( n \)-bit number \( x^b \mod p \) are zero:

\[
O_{k,b}(x) = \begin{cases} 
  \text{True} & \text{if MSB}_k(x^b \mod p) = 0, \\
  \text{False} & \text{otherwise}. 
\end{cases}
\]  (1)

The effective number of bits leaked from this oracle depends on the modulus length and bias, the underlying KDF properties, as well as implementation details, and can range from a fraction of a bit to several bytes in case the result is True. In the following subsections, we give four different constructions \( O^H, O^C, O^P, \) and \( O^D \) for such oracles. Then in Section 4, we instantiate such oracles in the context of TLS servers, and show in Section 5 how they can be used to run a full attack to uncover the complete premaster secret.

3.1 \( O^H \): Hash Function Invocation

In HMAC constructions (RFC 2104 [42]), the shared secret key \( g^{ab} \) may either be used directly in the HMAC computation (if \( |g^{ab}| \) is smaller than the maximal HMAC key size), or it must be hashed to a smaller size.

Consider a server that uses a DH prime modulus \( p \) with \( |p| = 1025 \) bits and a PRF based on HMAC-SHA384. For this PRF, the secret key \( k \) can at most be 128 bytes long, which is the input block size of the hash function SHA-384 (Table 1). For this purpose, the KDF first strips leading zero bits and then converts \( K \) to a byte sequence. Now the KDF program branches:

1. If the length of the byte sequence is at most 128 bytes, this byte sequence is used directly as the HMAC key \( k \).
2. If the length of the byte sequence is bigger than 128 bytes, the SHA-384 hash function is invoked once on this byte sequence, and the resulting hash value, padded with 80 zero bytes, is used as the HMAC key: \( k = h||0\times 0...0 \).

Now assume that a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacker observed a DH key exchange. The goal of the attacker is to learn the first bit of \( K = g^{ab} \mod p \). As described above, there are two possibilities for a server-side KDF to process the shared secret \( K = g^{ab} \):

- The most significant bit of \( K \) is 0. The server strips the leading zero bit and converts \( K \) to a byte array which will consist of 128 bytes. Since the byte array is 128 bytes long, it is directly used in the HMAC computation: HMAC SHA-384(\( K, seed \)).
- The most significant bit of \( K \) is 1. The server converts \( K \) to a byte array, which will consist of 129 bytes. A 129-byte long shared secret cannot be directly used in the HMAC computation (see also Subsection 2.3); before computing HMAC, the server needs to compute SHA-384 over \( K \). It can then use the SHA-384 output as an input for the HMAC computation.

Observe how a shared secret \( K \) starting with 1 results in an additional SHA-384 hash function invocation over \( K \). In the previous example, the modulus was exactly one bit bigger than the block size of the hash function and leaked only the most significant bit of the PMS. If the modulus is \( k \) bits bigger than the block size, the attacker has a chance of \( 1/2^k \) to leak the top \( k \) bits of the PMS. As we show in Section 6, this timing difference is observable by a remote attacker.

3.2 \( O^C \): Compression Function Invocations

This oracle exploits the number of invocations of the internal compression function if the second branch in \( O^H \) occurs, i.e., if the shared DH secret \( K = g^{ab} \) is bigger than the input block length of the HMAC hash function.

As mentioned in Subsection 2.2, hash functions based on the Merkle-Damgård scheme operate on blocks. The number of blocks a hash function has to process depends on the input length (see Table 1). If the DH shared secret \( K \) is used as a key for an HMAC computation, it can have distinct timing profiles depending on its length.
To give an example for HMAC-SHA384, consider a 1913-bit DH modulus \( p \), which is encoded in 240 bytes. The server-side KDF implementation now has to invoke the hash function over the shared key \( K \), since \( K \) is much larger than the allowed 128 bytes. We now get a MSBs oracle from the number of compression function invocations:

1. If the most significant bit of \( K \) is 0, \( K \) will be coded into 239 bytes. Even with the 17 bytes added for length and padding (cf. Table 1), it will fit into two blocks. Thus, the server will execute three hash compressions.
2. If the most significant bit of \( K \) is 1, \( K \) will be decoded into 240 bytes. Appending padding and the length field will fit into three blocks; the server will execute four hash compressions.

Analogously to the previous oracle, if the modulus is \( k \) bytes bigger than a critical block border, the attacker has a chance of \( \frac{1}{2^k} \) to leak the top \( k \) bits of the PMS, where \( \ell = k - \varepsilon \) (see Subsection 2.4).

### 3.3 \( \mathcal{O}^P \): Key Padding

Another side channel arises based on the number of padding bytes used to pad the DH shared key. The HMAC interface [42] pads keys to the block size of the hash function. The padding of the shared key can result in a timing side channel as different key lengths will lead to different amount of padding applied, and therefore to a different number of calls to the hash compression function. We show a practical attack based on this side channel in Appendix A.

### 3.4 \( \mathcal{O}^D \): Direct Side Channels

Until now, we discussed side channels based on small timing differences in the processing of the shared DH secret. However, it is possible that an implementation provides a direct oracle which does not rely on timing differences but relies on direct differences in behavior, such as error messages or handling of the connection state (like closing the underlying socket). If an implementation behaves differently depending on the shared secret, it provides an attacker with a direct side channel. The reason why these direct oracles might be plausible is that, for example, the zero byte is considered a special character in many programming languages. For example, in C the zero byte is used to terminate strings. This can result in programming errors, which can, in turn, lead to observable differences in response to network queries. We show in Section 7 that a non-negligible number of real-world servers indeed present such directly observable behavior differences. In all observed cases, this side channel only leaked the most significant byte of the PMS, which is equivalent to a leak of \( k = n \mod 8 \) bits for a prime \( p \) of bit-size \( n \).

### 3.5 Further Oracle Considerations

**Big number libraries.** Even if a protocol does maintain leading zero bytes of the shared secret, the used big number library might introduce an oracle that leaks the most significant bits. If the big number library does not maintain fixed-size big numbers internally, the resulting shared secret has to be padded by the application to the modulus size if the shared secret has fewer bytes than the modulus.

**Hitting the block boundaries with dangerous modulus sizes.** In our examples above, we used unusual modulus sizes of 1025 and 1913 bits to instantiate the length distinguishing oracles. We arrived at these numbers by computing the input lengths for a given hash function that leak the top \( x \) leading zero bits of the potential input at the critical block border of the \( n \)th block, using the following formula:

\[
\mathrm{cbb}(x, b, p, n) = n \cdot b - p + x,
\]

where \( b \) is the block size of the hash function in bits, and \( p \) is the fixed padding part of the hash function, also in bits.

**On the reliability of timing side channels.** If the attacker uses a timing side channel, the oracle will likely give occasionally wrong results, as timing measurements are inherently noisy. Thus, any classifier will exhibit some probability of false classification. The distinguishing attack can be made practical if the attacker can send several queries to the target. The attacker can then use standard statistical tests to build a reliable oracle out of the noisy oracle. We give more details in Subsection 6.1.

### 4 Raccoon Length Distinguishing Oracles in TLS

In this section, we first describe the high-level attack scenario. The main contribution of this section is a detailed analysis of the different TLS key derivation functions, which results in different critical block boundaries (cf. Subsection 3.5 and Table 2) to trigger the length distinguishing oracles. We concentrate our analysis on \( \mathcal{O}^P \) and \( \mathcal{O}^C \), which result from the TLS design combined with the hash function properties (e.g., different timing profiles for inputs of different block lengths). We stress that \( \mathcal{O}^P \) and \( \mathcal{O}^C \) are implementation-dependent and can potentially be found exploitable at any block boundary.

#### 4.1 TLS Attack Scenarios

For the attack scenarios described below, the attacker needs access to a functional oracle from Section 3. Furthermore, the honest client and server have to use a vulnerable TLS version and negotiate TLS-DHE or a connection with a static TLS key share.

**Raccoon**: Length distinguishing attack on ephemeral keys. The goal of the Raccoon attack is to detect the leading bits in the DH shared secret in a MitM attacker model with ephemeral keys. If the attacker wants to perform the attack, it
can measure the presented side channels in Section 3 at two different positions within a TLS connection:

- The attacker can target the server and measure the time the server used to compute the premaster secret. The attacker can do this by measuring the time between the server receiving the ClientKeyExchange message and the server sending its Finished message.
- Or, the attacker can target the client and measure the time the client used to compute the premaster secret. The attacker can do this by measuring the time the client took to read the ServerKeyExchange message up to sending the Finished message by the client.

By repeatedly observing TLS-DHE handshakes between an honest client A and an honest server B the attacker can learn typical timing values. After this, the attacker will be able to detect if leading zero bytes are present in the unknown pms by observing faster response times.

This length distinguishing attack is applicable even if the server does not reuse ephemeral DH values. However, in this case the attack poses little threat in practice, since the attacker merely learns the length of a fully ephemeral, one-time shared secret. This does not allow the attacker to decrypt or modify traffic.

**Raccoon**: **Length distinguishing attack on a static key.** In this scenario, the attacker has recorded a previous TLS-DH(E) session, and the goal is to recover the length of the premaster secret used in this session between two honest peers. In contrast to Raccoon, in this scenario, the server uses a static key, or is reusing the same ephemeral DH secret for a certain period of time, covering the recorded TLS-DHE session and the full duration of the attack.

To perform the attack, the attacker selects an appropriate oracle of \(O^H, O^C, O^P\) and \(O^D\) from Section 3, connects to the server and sends a Diffie-Hellman share in a ClientKeyExchange message. For the length distinguishing attack, this ClientKeyExchange message contains the originally observed key share from the honest client. Note that an attacker can also send related key shares here to retrieve the MSBs of related premaster secrets (see Section 5). Of course, the attacker cannot construct a valid Finished message since the secret key is unknown to the attacker. The server receiving a message crafted by the attacker will, therefore, terminate the connection by either sending a fatal Alert message or closing the TCP connection. However, the server always needs to compute the premaster secret and derive the master secret using the PRF. Therefore, the server’s response will depend on the leading bits of the premaster secret.

If the attacker uses a timing side channel, the reliability of the side channel can be improved as described in Subsection 3.5.

### 4.2 Analysis of TLS Key Derivations

Since the TLS key derivation is of special interest for this paper, we will analyze it in detail. The starting point for the key derivation is the PMS. In a two-step key derivation, first a master secret is computed from this premaster secret, and then two sets of keys (one for each communication direction) are derived from the master secret.

How exactly the master secret is derived from the premaster secret depends on the negotiated protocol version and cipher suite. Note that an attacker can observe the ClientKeyExchange message on any version or cipher suite and then send it as part of a different protocol version and cipher suite to a server (as long as the server supports it). We now analyze different TLS versions and how they use the premaster secret to derive further keys with their PRFs. Our analysis of critical block borders is summarized in Table 2.

**Table 2: Key derivation properties of non-PSK cipher suites.** The first and second column provide the protocol version, cipher suite, and the hash algorithms used in the key derivation function. The last column provides critical block borders for premaster secrets pms in bytes. For example, a 239-byte long pms consumes one less SHA-384 hash compression than a 240 bytes long pms.

**TLS 1.2.** In TLS 1.2 the master secret is derived from an HMAC-based PRF construction. The master secret is computed as:

\[
ms = \text{PRF}(pms, label, ClientRandom || ServerRandom).
\]

The premaster secret will be used as a key for HMAC operations within the PRF. The used HMAC depends on the selected cipher suite. Per default, SHA-256 is used, but the cipher suite could also specify the usage of SHA-384 (if the cipher suite name ends with _SHA384). For TLS 1.2 the side channel analysis of Section 3 can be directly applied. The premaster secret maximum size is the size of the DH key. In configurations with recommended DH key sizes larger than 2000 bits, the computed premaster secret will with overwhelming probability be larger than the block border (64 bytes for SHA-256 and 128 bytes for SHA-384). If the premaster secret is larger than the block size of the hash function, it must be hashed before using it in the HMAC computation. This potentially enables a side channel based on the number of hash compression function invocations (cf. Subsection 3.2).
Note that in the case of SHA-384-PRFs with DH key sizes slightly bigger than 1024 bits, the hash function invocation side channel and the resulting oracle $O^h$ can be used (see Subsection 3.1).

**TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1.** These two protocol versions use the same PRF, which is based on a combination of SHA-1 and MD5. In this PRF, the premaster secret is split into two halves: The first half enters an expansion function based on MD5, while the second half enters a distinct key expansion function based on SHA-1. The final output of the TLS 1.0 and 1.1 PRF is the XOR of these two expansion functions. If the premaster secret has an odd number of bytes, the byte in the middle of the PMS will be used by both halves.

Since TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 split the shared secret into two halves, the computations for inputs that reach the block borders changes in comparison to TLS 1.2, as each hash function adds its own padding and length bytes internally. Note that since two hash functions are used at the same time (with identical input lengths and hash function properties such as input block size, length, and padding, see Table 1), the created side channel is amplified. For TLS 1.0 and TLS 1.1 the size of inputs which leak the top $x$ leading zero bytes at the $n$th block border can be computed with the formula
\[
\text{cbb}_{\text{TLS1.0/1.1}}(x,n) = (64n - 9) \cdot 2 + x, \tag{2}
\]
where $x$ is the number of most significant bytes to be leaked.

**SSLv3.** Even though SSLv3 is deprecated, there still exist servers on the web which support it.\(^5\) SSLv3 key derivation is strictly different from the key derivation used in TLS. While the leading zero bytes from the premaster secret are stripped, the master secret is then computed as
\[
\text{ns := MD5}(\text{pms} \parallel \text{SHA1}(\text{pms} \mid "A" \mid r1 \parallel r2)) \parallel \\
\text{MD5}(\text{pms} \parallel \text{SHA1}(\text{pms} \mid "BB" \mid r1 \parallel r2)) \parallel \\
\text{MD5}(\text{pms} \parallel \text{SHA1}(\text{pms} \mid "CCC" \mid r1 \parallel r2)), \tag{3}
\]
where $r1 := \text{ClientRandom}$ and $r2 := \text{ServerRandom}$.

This computation results in more opportunities for an attacker to construct a possible side channel from an additional hash function compression invocation. The outer MD5 functions hash the shared secret in concatenation with the output of the inner SHA-1 function. The outer function adds an offset of 20 bytes to the shared secret. As this operation is done three times, the side channel within the MD5 computation is amplified by a factor of three. The inner SHA-1 computation hashes different inputs each time. The first call hashes a label of length 1, while the second call hashes a label of length 2, and the last call hashes a label of length 3. Each time two (32-byte long) random values of the client and server are hashed as well. This generates a total offset of 65, 66 and 67 bytes, respectively. The resulting inputs (in bytes) which leak the top $x$ leading zero bytes at the $n$th block in SSLv3 can therefore be computed as:
\[
\begin{align*}
c\text{bb}_{\text{SSL}}(x,n) &= 64n - (9 + 20) + x \\
c\text{bb}_{\text{SSL-A}}(x,n) &= 64n - (9 + 65) + x; \quad n > 1 \\
c\text{bb}_{\text{SSL-BB}}(x,n) &= 64n - (9 + 66) + x; \quad n > 1 \\
c\text{bb}_{\text{SSL-CCC}}(x,n) &= 64n - (9 + 67) + x; \quad n > 1
\end{align*}
\]

**TLS DHE-PSK.** Although not as widespread, TLS also offers a variety of cipher suites that allow the usage of preshared keys (PSK)\(^3\). In DHE-PSK, the client basically performs the same handshake as a normal DHE handshake, resulting in the shared DH value $g^{ab} \mod p$. Then, both client and server authenticate using a premaster secret which is computed based on the preshared key PSK as
\[
\text{pms} := \text{len}(g^{ab} \mod p) \parallel g^{ab} \mod p \parallel \text{len(PSK)} \parallel \text{PSK}, \tag{5}
\]
where $\text{len}(x)$ indicates a two-byte length value of $x$ (in bytes).

Since DHE-PSK changes the way the premaster secret is computed, the block borders for the Raccoon attack change as well. Interestingly, the block borders depend on the length of the preshared key PSK. DHE-PSK shifts the length of the PMS, which enters the PRF by $4 + |\text{PSK}|$ bytes. This can bring otherwise unfeasible modulus sizes in proximity to the critical block border for the attacker. An attacker being able to set a PSK for an arbitrary, attacker-controlled identity could therefore choose a PSK to reach the advantageous critical block boundaries. A related side channel exists in SSH and is described in Section 8.

If the attacker is not an authenticated user, they could use the DHE-PSK premaster secret processing within the PRF to perform a different length-distinguishing attack. Since the PSK length also directly influences the PRF computation time, the server response time could be used to determine the length of the PSK. Note that this is possible even if the server does not repeat the DH public keys and strictly uses ephemeral keys in DHE-PSK.

### 4.3 Dangerous TLS Modulus Sizes

Since the server chooses the modulus size and the attacker has no variable-size inputs to the PRF (except for DHE-PSK cipher suites), the attacker cannot influence the block borders of the hash function and thus optimize their usability as a side channel. Usually servers choose moduli whose lengths are of the form $2^n$, like $2^{10} = 1024$, $2^{11} = 2048$ or $2^{12} = 4096$. The server is free to deviate from these and move to arbitrary sizes. For common bit lengths $2^n$, the block border will never realistically reach a critical block border as the PMS would require too many leading zero bits. However, if a server deviates from these common modulus sizes, it can become possible for an attacker to hit the critical block borders. For example, LibTomCrypt\(^6\) used to create 1036 bit

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\(^5\) According to the SSL pulse measurements of September 2020, SSLv3 is supported by 4.4% of the servers from the Alexa top 150k list.

\(^6\) https://github.com/libtom/libtomcrypt
moduli, which would make $O^H$ feasible. A list of dangerous modulus sizes is given in an extended version of this paper.7

5 Raccoon Premaster Secret Recovery Attack

Until now, we have discussed a distinguishing attack on TLS, which allows an attacker to determine leading zero bytes of the premaster secret. If the server reuses the DH values for multiple connections (cf. [62]), the distinguishing attack can be turned into a full premaster secret recovery attack. This is the case for TLS-DH and for TLS-DHE if the server disregards best practices and reuses ephemeral keys. Our attack is based on the well-known Hidden Number Problem described by Boneh and Venkatesan [17].

We use the attack scenario Raccoon from Subsection 4.1 which leaks the top $k$ bits of the PMS. We assume the server reuses the same secret DH exponent $b$; this reuse does usually not depend on the TLS version or cipher suite (except for export cipher suites not considered here), so our Raccoon attacker can choose a beneficial TLS version and cipher suite for the attack, as long as they are supported by the server. The attack proceeds in four phases:

Phase 1: Passive MitM. In this phase, the attacker records a complete TLS-DH(E) session and extracts $g^a$ from the ClientKeyExchange message as well as $g^b$, $g$ and $p$ from the ServerKeyExchange or Certificate message.

Phase 2: Active web attacker. In this phase, the attacker interacts as a client with the server. However, instead of choosing a secret ephemeral DH value $a'$ and sending $g^{a'}$ in the ClientKeyExchange message, the attacker chooses random values $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and sends the value $x_i = g^{a} g^{r_i}$ in the ClientKeyExchange message (cf. Figure 3). To finish this part of the TLS handshake, the attacker sends a ChangeCipherSpec and the client’s finished message, where the content of the finished message is chosen randomly because the attacker lacks the keys (master secret and the symmetric keys) to compute a valid finished message correctly.

After sending ClientKeyExchange, the attacker starts measuring a chosen length distinguishing oracle $O^H$, $O^C$, $O^P$, or $O^P^H$, until some alert message arrives from the server. The attacker may repeat the measurement by sending the same value $r_i$ to the server until some statistical test (e.g., Mann-Whitney [45]) indicates that a sufficiently high probability level has been reached. If the measurement indicates that the leading $k$ bits have been stripped, we have found a candidate $r_i$ for an HNP equation. If the measured time indicates that less than $k$ bits have been stripped, a new random value $r_{i+1}$ is chosen by the attacker and phase 2 is repeated.

Phase 3: Constructing an instance of HNP. Now that the attacker has learned that for the candidate $r_i$ the oracle $O_{h,i}(r_i)$ is True, the attacker knows that $0 < r_i^2 \mod p = g^{ab} g^{r_i} \mod p < 2^{n-k}$. Subtracting $2^{n-k-1}$, we obtain the centered equation

$$|\alpha \cdot t_i \mod p - y_i| < 2^{n-k-1} = p/2^{m+1},$$

where $\alpha := g^{ab} \mod p$ is unknown (the hidden number) and $t_i := (g^b)^{r_i} \mod p$, $y_i := 2^{n-k-1}$ are known to the attacker.

Equation 6 corresponds to the randomized version of HNP as defined by Boneh and Venkatesan [17], except that in our case the oracle does not reveal the MSBs directly, but only whether they are zero or not. Moreover, we center the equation around zero and take the bias of $p$ into account, as in [51].

Phase 4: Computing the premaster secret. Phase 2 and 3 are repeated until the attacker has obtained a sufficient number of equations to solve the HNP instance and recovers the hidden number $g^{ab}$, which is the premaster secret of the connection the attacker observed in phase 1 of the attack. We will show in Subsection 6.2 that this is indeed possible. With the premaster secret the attacker can then derive the master secret; with the master secret the attacker can proceed to compute the symmetric keys and decrypt the connection.

6 Evaluation

In this section, we will analyze if the requirements of the Raccoon attack can actually be fulfilled by a real-world attacker, namely, measuring the timing difference by the created side channel and solving the HNP for real modulus sizes with realistic leak sizes.

6.1 Timing Measurements

As demonstrated by the Lucky 13 attack [6], applying a hash function to inputs of varying lengths results in a measurable difference in processing times. We now shortly revisit this finding by evaluating the OpenSSL library (version 1.1.1), before putting it in the context of our attack.

Figure 3 shows a plot of the processing time (in cycles) to compute HMAC with SHA-256 and SHA-384 for keys of varying lengths, on 1024-byte messages. To simplify the presentation, we report the median processing time across 10,000 experiments per input length. The step-like increase in processing time as the key size increases can clearly be seen. The first step in the increase of processing time leads to oracle $O^H$, the hash function invocation oracle. The subsequent, slightly smaller steps lead to oracle $O^C$, the compression function invocation oracle. The smallest visible steps (for SHA-256, when the input length is $128 \cdot k - i, 1 \leq i \leq 8$, and similarly for SHA-384) lead to oracle $O^P$; we analyze the cost of exploiting this side channel in Appendix A.

Is the difference in processing times measurable in a remote setting? To measure if the side channel is big enough for a remote attacker, we created a test setup consisting of two (non-virtual) machines, one simulating the attacker machine and one simulating a victim server. The machines are directly connected with a 1 Gbit/s connection. The attacker

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7https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1151
machine used an Exablaze ExaNIC HPT network adapter. This network card is specifically built to generate high precision hardware timestamps.

For the evaluation, a tool on the attacker machine repeatedly performed handshakes with the victim TLS server. The tool generated a DH private value and computed the resulting DH shared secret, alternating between handshakes where the DH secret starts with a single leading zero byte or no leading zero bytes. For each handshake, the tool recorded the fact if the MSBs of the DH secret are zero, as well as the server’s response time. To analyze whether the side channel is measurable we used a modulus size of 1032 bits, as this creates the hash function invocation side channel $O^H$ (see Subsection 3.1). We collected 100,000 measurements each for premaster secrets with a leading zero byte and without a leading zero byte.

In broad terms, the attacker would use a classifier to approximate the oracle’s response. That is, the attacker collects server response times from handshakes using DH share $g^x$, and attempts to deduce from these measurements the oracle response $O^H(g^x)$. Any classifier will exhibit some probability of false classification. False negatives occur when the classifier concludes that $O^H(x) = \text{False}$ when $O^H(x) = \text{True}$. Similarly, false positives occur when the classifier wrongly concludes $O^H(x) = \text{True}$ when $O^H(x) = \text{False}$.

In our experiments, the Mann-Whitney test [45] performed very well for distinguishing between the two cases. This test can be configured with a desired false positive probability, which then determines the (empirical) false negative probability. With 100 samples per case (200 measurements overall) and a 10% false positive rate, the false negative rate was 10.4% (we also empirically confirmed that the false positive rate is 10%). To estimate these false-reporting rates, we conducted 200,000 experiments, where in each experiment the samples for each set were randomly selected from the pool of 100,000 collected samples. Increasing the number of samples to 1,000 (2,000 measurements overall) allowed us to achieve a false positive rate of 0.009200% and a false negative rate of 0.000795%.

An attacker would have to account for the false reporting rates when performing the attack. In order to deal with false positives, the attacker re-measures timings for any reported positive. That is, the attacker first performs 200 measurements for each $x$ value. For values where the classifier outputs $O^H(x) = \text{True}$, the attacker re-measures the processing time for $x$, obtaining 2,000 more measurements, and re-runs the classifier.

Iterating over a total of $m$ DH values, in expectation at most $m \cdot 255/256$ true negatives, of which $m \cdot 255/256 \cdot 10\% \cdot 0.009200\% = m \cdot 9.1 \cdot 10^{-6}$ will be falsely labeled as positives in both classification rounds. Similarly, $m/256$ are true positives, of which $m/256 \cdot (1 - 10.4\%) \cdot (1 - 0.000795\%) = m \cdot 0.35\%$ will be correctly labeled as positives in both classification rounds.

The attacker needs to collect roughly 180 true positive values to solve the HNP problem for a 1024 bit modulus (see Section 6.2). Choosing $m = 55,000$ results in 192 correctly identified positives in expectation, and 0.5 false positives. The overall required number of timing samples is therefore 22.34 million. These numbers are not necessarily optimal.

Other classification methods and scenarios. Estimating the cost of performing the attack over the public Internet is an interesting challenge, but outside the scope of this work. Crosby et al. have examined the feasibility of performing such timing attacks and found significant variability that depends on the attacker and victim hosts and the distance between them [22]. They have also suggested a different classifier than the one we use, the “Box Test”. We have in fact, initially used this test as our classifier, but it significantly underperformed the Mann-Whitney test. Surprisingly, Crosby et al. have also considered the Mann-Whitney test, but reported that it underperformed their Box Test [22] (their test setup includes measurements on the same LAN, similarly to ours, as well as measurements over the Internet). The reason for this discrepancy is unclear to us. At any rate, providing a comprehensive comparison of classifiers is again an interesting task, but also out of scope for this work.

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8To estimate these lower rates, we ran our classifier on 20 million sets of randomly-sampled 2,000 measurements.

9If we denote the most significant byte of the modulus as $v$, then $v^{−1/256}$ shared secrets are true negatives. It is common for $v$ to be smaller than 256, slightly lowering the attack cost, but we prefer to give a worst-case analysis.
6.2 Solving the HNP

We simulated and solved the HNP problem for DH groups $G$ around 1024 bits, we could solve the equations with an 8-bit generator by the column vectors of measurements to solve an instance of the HNP, as described.

$\delta$ difference in a remote setup. An attacker can then use the cipher suites, an attacker might be able to measure the timing difference from the presented side channel.

6.3 Putting It All Together

computer algebra system. The results are shown in Table 3.

algorithm with two block sizes of the Block-Korkine-Zolotareff [59] lattice basis reduction ± the second vector (after $L_\ell$ and $L_r$) approximately $\sqrt{d+2}/12 \cdot p$. But also, by the Gaussian heuristic, the length of a “typical” shortest vector in $L(B)$ is approximately $\sqrt{(d+2)/(2\pi\epsilon)}(\det B)^{1/(d+2)}$, where $\det B \approx 2^{d-1}p^{d+1}$. If the number $d$ of equations is sufficiently large and $\ell$ is not too small, $v_2$ is expected to be smaller than typical shortest vectors in $L(B)$ and we may hope to recover $\pm v_2$ as the second vector (after $\pm v_1$) in a reduced basis of $L(B)$.

For our experiments we used the BKZ 2.0 [21] version of the Block-Korkine-Zolotareff [59] lattice basis reduction algorithm with two block sizes $\beta = 40, 60$. We used the implementation of the mpfr mpfr library [26] in the SageMath [64] computer algebra system. The results are shown in Table 3.

6.3 Putting It All Together

As we have shown in Subsection 6.1, it generally is possible to measure the timing difference from the presented side channel. Depending on the modulus size, the supported version and cipher suites, an attacker might be able to measure the timing difference in a remote setup. An attacker can then use the measurements to solve an instance of the HNP, as described in Subsection 6.2. We showed that for real modulus sizes (around 1024 bits), we could solve the equations with an 8-bit leak. This demonstrates that it is generally possible to perform the Raccoon secret recovery attack against TLS, and therefore compute the PMS and decrypt the session. Currently deployed TLS servers also commonly use 2048-bit moduli. Solving the HNP for those sizes and an 8-bit leak is yet unsolved, and it is still an open question how hard it actually is. Nevertheless, note that an attacker can potentially leak more than 8 bits, making the attack feasible against bigger moduli.

7 Alexa Top 100k Scan

To estimate the impact of the vulnerability on currently deployed servers, we conducted a scan among the Alexa Top 100k on port 443. We evaluated how common static-DH cipher suites are by trying to negotiate them. Additionally, we evaluated how prevalent key reuse is in TLS-DHE and evaluated the used modulus sizes. We also tried to find servers that are vulnerable to a direct oracle by sending ClientKeyExchange messages, which either resulted in a PMS with a leading zero byte or not and by observing the server’s behavior. For this purpose, we used techniques from [16, 46] and carefully observed the TCP connection state and tried omitting messages. We performed each handshake three times to rule out inconsistencies in the server behavior. If a server showed at least occasionally different behavior, we performed additional handshakes (97 each) to collect more data on the issue.

DH & DHE support. The results of our scan are shown in Table 4. In total, 86607 servers of the scanned servers supported SSL/TLS. A total of 32% of the scanned servers supported DHE cipher suites. Only a single server advertised support for static DH cipher suites.

Key reuse. Although typically servers reuse ephemeral keys until they are restarted, it is not enough to monitor the ephemeral key in two consecutive handshakes in order to validate if a server reuses ephemeral keys, as many hosts are using load balancing setups in which multiple different TLS servers are handling incoming connections. Usually, each server manages its own ephemeral keys, and these keys are not shared across servers. Since we do not know how many potential servers are within a load balancing setup, we do not know how many handshakes we have to perform to make sure that we can detect key reuse. To overcome this issue, we observed all public keys which were transmitted to us during the whole scanning process. If we observed at least one reuse, we considered the server as a server reusing ephemeral keys. We did not evaluate for how long these servers reused their public keys, as this would require a longitudinal study that is outside the scope of this work.

Our scans showed that a total of 3.33% of the scanned servers reused their ephemeral DH keys. This is slightly lower than the 4.4% reported by Springall et al. in 2016 [62], but note that Springall et al. scanned the Alexa Top 1 Million, whereas we scanned the Alexa Top 100K. Furthermore, DHE
1.3% of servers supporting DHE reused values for at least one
Advisory K91158923 (CVE-2020-5929). These servers were
with the corresponding key length.

Table 4: The observed key lengths for DHE cipher suites in
Table 3: Our parameter choices and calculation costs to recover
the discovered oracles to F5. F5 confirmed the vulnerability
printed this vulnerability and were able to attribute most of
servers (84) were reusing their ephemeral keys. We finger-
perfect direct oracle as described in Subsection 3.4, mean-

support by major clients declined during this period, and
OpenSSL removed ephemeral key reuse in 2016. Springall et
al. did measure the time period for key reuse, and found that
1.3% of servers supporting DHE reused values for at least one
day, and 1.2% for at least 7 days.

Key lengths. The key lengths used by the scanned servers
can be seen in Table 4. The data shows that servers that
reuse ephemeral keys generally tend to use weaker keys than
servers who do not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Modulus sizes</th>
<th># Domains</th>
<th># With key reuse</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1024 bits</td>
<td>5310</td>
<td>2213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2048 bits</td>
<td>23428</td>
<td>1116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4096 bits</td>
<td>3045</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8192 bits</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32061</td>
<td>3333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: The observed key lengths for DHE cipher suites in
the Alexa Top 100k scan. Units denote the number of domains
with the corresponding key length.

Perfect direct oracles. A total of 87 servers were exhibiting
a perfect direct oracle as described in Subsection 3.4, mean-
ing that they were reliably showing different behavior based
on the leading zero byte of the PMS. Almost all of these
servers (84) were reusing their ephemeral keys. We finger-
printed this vulnerability and were able to attribute most of
the discovered oracles to F5. F5 confirmed the vulnerability
and released a patch on the 9th of September 2020 in Security
Advisory K91158923 (CVE-2020-5929). These servers were
sending either one or two handshake failure alerts depending
on whether the PMS started with a zero byte or not. The vul-
nerness was not present on all supported cipher suites. Note
that an attacker could still use any vulnerable cipher suite to
attack the connection of a non-vulnerable cipher suite.

Imperfect direct oracles. We found 815 servers which did
not show a perfect oracle, meaning that they did not allow for
a distinction with every executed handshake, but only occa-
sionally showed a distinguishing behavior. We assume that
we observe this behavior because of another factor that we did
not control (or cannot control) that influences the behavior
difference. These factors may include CDN setups, where only
parts of the CDN are vulnerable, internal memory allocations,
network issues, or resource shortages. We did not exclude
these hosts from our study but investigated if the behavior
difference correlates with a leading zero byte in the PMS or
not. Any behavior difference unrelated to a leading zero byte
is expected to happen with roughly the same probability on all
executed handshakes. If the difference is somehow related to
a leading zero byte, we should see a non-uniform distribution
of the responses, which can be used by an attacker to distin-
guish if the PMS for a given ClientKeyExchange message
will start with a zero byte or not. To check if the behavior
difference is sufficiently correlating, we used Fisher’s Exact
test [33] in the cases where we observed only two different
responses, while we used the Chi-square [34] test if we had
more than two different responses from a server. These tests
compute a p-value, which indicates whether a null hypothe-
sis is correct. In our case, the null hypothesis was that the
observed behavior difference was appearing by chance, and
is unrelated to a leading zero byte. For each host, we tested
each cipher suite in each protocol version individually and
accepted all hosts as vulnerable for which the p-value on one
of the executed tests was smaller than $10^{-9}$. Given these tests,
we discovered that a total of 815 servers (excluding perfect oracles) showed an observable difference based on a leading zero byte in the PMS, however, none of these servers were reusing ephemeral public keys. As of the time of writing, we do not know which implementation is responsible for this behavior.

**Conclusion.** The evaluation shows that a non-negligible amount of servers are reusing ephemeral keys, and therefore are generally vulnerable to Raccoon attack. Over 66% of those servers use keys that can be exploited by us with $k = 8$, while the remaining servers require more bits to be leaked in order to practically solve the HNP with our approach. The data also shows that $O_D$ is found in real TLS implementations.

## 8 Impact on TLS and Beyond

**Exploitability.** The Raccoon attack is generally hard to exploit, since the prerequisites for the attack are quite rare nowadays. Parallel to the disclosure of this vulnerability, the last major browser (Firefox) stopped supporting DHE cipher suites. Even if the conditions of the attack are met, the attack still requires precise timing measurements, which are hard to perform in real networks.

Stronger attackers in a co-located setup may be able to use more advanced techniques like cache side channels to avoid timing measurements. We consider these stronger attacker models outside the scope of this work.

**Attacking ECDH and ECDHE Cipher Suites.** ECDH(E) cipher suites are generally not affected by the Raccoon attack, as TLS mandates that leading zero bytes are preserved. However, we identified some implementations which strip leading zero bytes from the coordinates, and then add those bytes back. This may result in a small timing side channel that leaks the MSB of the x-coordinate of the shared point. The EC-HNP [38] is related to the HNP and could potentially be applied here. However, a full analysis of this potential vulnerability is outside the scope of this work.

**Downgrading TLS Sessions to DHE.** Typical TLS connections are established with TLS ECDHE cipher suites. If an attacker can perform the complete attack within the handshake timeout, the attacker could perform a downgrade attack, and target TLS sessions that would otherwise not use Diffie-Hellman. The attacker acts as a MitM, and removes any non-DHE cipher suites from the cipher suite list in the `ClientHello` message. Assuming both the client and server support at least one common DHE cipher suite, they will then attempt to handshake with it. The primary defense mechanism in TLS against such attacks is the `Finished` message, which includes a hash over the entire session transcript. But since the attacker learns the shared secret within the handshake timeout, the attacker can forge a valid `Finished` message, leading to a full break in security.

However, performing the attack fast enough is likely infeasible. The typical handshake timeout is around 30 seconds. The attacker needs to handshake with the victim server millions of times within this short period while performing accurate timing measurements for each server response. Furthermore, the attacker then needs to solve an instance of the HNP problem, which we were only able to accomplish with hours of computation time for small leaks.

One caveat is that some TLS libraries exhibit behavior that allows an attacker to stall TLS handshakes indefinitely [2]. Such behavior would make the online downgrade plausible.

Moreover, TLS False Start [44] allows the client to send encrypted application-layer data before receiving the server’s `Finished` message. In principle, if the client is willing to use DHE with False Start, the attacker does not need to learn the shared secret within the handshake timeout, but rather at any point in the future. The data sent under False Start is typically particularly sensitive, such as authentication cookies; compromise of this data at any point in the (short) future typically leads to a full break in security. The False Start standard explicitly allows DHE cipher suites, but only with well-known groups with 3072-bit modulus or larger; however, typical TLS client implementations disallow DHE use with False Start altogether. To summarize, this concern is mostly theoretical.

TLS 1.3. In TLS 1.3 the leading zero bytes are preserved for DHE cipher suites (as well as for ECDHE ones). So broadly speaking, Raccoon does not apply to TLS 1.3. Note that our attack could work on a variant of TLS 1.3, which explicitly allows key reuse (or even encourages it), called ETS or eTLS [60]. If ephemeral keys get reused in either variant, they could lead to micro-architectural side channels.

**DTLS.** The DTLS KDF [55] is analogous to that of TLS, and has the same properties with regards to timing. However, an attacker may not be able to measure the timing difference, as DTLS does not necessarily send an error message when sessions are ungracefully terminated: DTLS is UDP-based, so it does not send TCP FIN or RST packets, and some implementations do not send alert messages at all. An attacker may be able to overcome these difficulties using techniques similar to [7], but we consider this out of scope for this work.

**SSH.** In SSH, ephemeral key reuse is far less common than in TLS (as shown by [65] in 2017). This is probably due to the more homogeneous deployment of SSH, and the raised security requirements, as a break in SSH could lead to remote code execution. In SSH, the shared secret is encoded as an `mpint`, which explicitly removes leading zero bytes. In contrast to TLS, the shared secret is hashed with the session transcript to generate the ‘exchange hash’. This essentially removes the attack prerequisite for a dangerous modulus size. The attacker can guarantee that the difference of a stripped zero byte always results in less processed blocks within the hash function, since attacker-controlled messages with non-fixed length are included in the computation. To summarize,
SSl servers which reuse ephemeral DH values are at greater risk to the attack than TLS servers which do so, but such SSH servers are rare. Interestingly, SSH also strips the leading zero bytes of the shared secret for X25519. RFC 8731 [1] explicitly mentions that this is a potential problem, as it leaks the leading zero byte of the shared secret, but decided not to address the issue for backwards compatibility reasons.

**Hybrid key exchange in TLS.** Hybrid key exchange refers to the practice of using two key exchange algorithms in parallel. The primary motivation is to use both a classical key exchange algorithm and a post-quantum one, in hopes of achieving security as long as at least one of the algorithms is not broken. As of the initial publication of this work, preliminary work by the IETF on such designs centered on an Internet Draft, “Hybrid key exchange in TLS 1.3” [23]. The original language in that document allowed for variable-length secrets, should the need arise in the future. Shortly after this work was originally published, we have reached out to the IETF regarding this issue. In response to our findings, the document no longer allows for variable-length secrets, and the security consideration section now notes the danger in using such secrets.

**Other protocols.** XML Encryption [31] and IPsec [40, Section 2.14] preserve leading zero bytes. JSON Web Encryption [39] only offers ECDH key agreement. The established shared secret is processed according to NIST SP 800-56A [53], which requires leading zero bytes to be preserved.

9 Related Work

 timing side channels caused by hash functions. In 2013, AlFardan and Paterson showed that tiny timing differences by processing inputs of different lengths can be used for the Lucky 13 attack [6]. Albrecht et al. showed that years later, the same vulnerability was still affecting real-world implementations and common (but not recommended) mitigation techniques are ineffective [5]. Some developers have changed the interface of HMAC functions to mitigate flaws like Lucky 13 [54]. These interfaces now also take the maximum amount of data that could have been passed to the HMAC function as an input.

**Bleichenbacher’s Attack.** Daniel Bleichenbacher was the first to describe a real-world attack on TLS recovering the premaster secret [15]. His attack relied on a direct oracle where the server revealed if the decrypted RSA plaintext was PKCS#1 compliant or not. The primary condition for this compliance is for the two most significant bytes of the plaintext to take a specific value, making the attack somewhat similar to Raccoon. Furthermore, Bleichenbacher’s attack relies on an attacker choosing a multiplier $s$ and querying whether $m \cdot s$ starts with these specific MSBs, where $m$ is the plaintext the attacker wishes to decrypt. One could therefore think that Raccoon could be mounted using the same attack algorithm. However, in Raccoon the attacker cannot choose the multiplier. Rather, the attacker can only compute $g^m$ for a known $r$, and query whether $g^{rb} \cdot g^{srb}$ is compliant; the first multiplier essentially acts as a pseudorandom function from the attacker’s point of view. Recent work by Ronen et al. [57] does use lattices and the HNP to perform the attack in parallel, but most variants of Bleichenbacher’s attack use ad-hoc algorithms where the attacker carefully chooses values for $s$. To conclude, while Raccoon shares some similarities to Bleichenbacher’s attack, and both can be mounted using HNP solvers, the latter is often mounted using simpler algorithms.

**Attacks on export-grade crypto.** Another line of attacks exploited the usage of export-grade cryptography and obsolete protocols to break TLS. DROWN recovered premaster secrets from secure TLS-RSA connections by exploiting public-key reuse and instances of the (deprecated) SSLv2 protocol [10]; DROWN is also an instance of Bleichenbacher’s attack. Logjam [2] and FREAK [13] targeted 512-bit key sizes used in DHE-EXPORT and RSA-EXPORT cipher suites to recover the PMS based on weak export keys. Raccoon attack does not rely on the presence of outdated cryptographic mechanisms.

**Timing attacks against the TLS handshake.** Brumley and Boneh measured the timing differences in TLS-RSA decryption on different ciphertexts [20]. From these timing differences, they were able to compute the private key of the server. Meyer et al. constructed a Bleichenbacher oracle from timing differences in the handling of valid and invalid PKCS#1 messages, which they used to compute the PMS of a previously recorded TLS-RSA session [47].

**Attacks using HNP solvers.** The HNP has been applied in many attacks against DSA, ECDSA with partially known nonces and signatures in zero-knowledge proofs, using a variety of side channels [11, 24, 35, 51, 52]. Breitner and Heninger used a lattice-based HNP solver to compute private ECDSA signing keys generated by cryptocurrency code [18]. Some previous attacks on the TLS protocols also have made use of lattice techniques and HNP solvers. Brumley and Tuveri exploited a timing side channel in the ECDSA signature generation during the TLS handshake [19].

**Attacks against TLS Diffie-Hellman.** In addition to the above-mentioned Logjam attack [2], there exist several studies on the security of TLS Diffie-Hellman. Valenta et al. 10

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10However, the document noted that all Round 2 candidates for post-quantum key exchange have fixed length for the shared secret.
analyzed the impact of small-subgroup attacks [65]. Dorey et al. analyzed how plausibly deniable backdoored parameters could be generated [30]. Additionally, they performed a study to analyze the prevalence of such parameters.

**Proofs on TLS-DH(E).** TLS-DHE and TLS-DH have been proven secure under the PRF-ODH assumption by [37] and [43], respectively. As this work has shown, this assumption is not met by current real-world TLS implementations.

### 10 Conclusions

Beyond the specifics of the attack, we argue that its existence can also teach us broader lessons for cryptographic protocols. **Forgetting forward secrecy is dangerous.** Forward secrecy is a well-known security goal for cryptographic protocols and was intensively analyzed in the context of TLS in [62]. Our attack exploits the fact that servers may reuse the secret DH exponent for many sessions, thus forgoing forward secrecy. In this context, Raccoon teaches a lesson for protocol security: For protocols where some cryptographic secrets can be continuously queried by one of the parties, the attack surface is made broader. The Raccoon attack shows that we should be careful when giving attackers access to such queries.

**Secrets should be constant-size.** The dangers of non-constant-time implementations are well-known. For example, they have been repeatedly demonstrated to break ECDSA as used in TLS. One of the reasons for these breaks is that the processing of variable-length secret values within the implementation usually results in non-constant execution time. We argue that future protocol designs should make sure that all their secrets (including intermediate values and their internal number representation) are of fixed size.

**Countermeasures.** The most straightforward mitigation against the attack is to remove support for TLS-DH(E) entirely, as most major client implementations have already stopped supporting them. Moreover, server operators should disable DHE key reuse, which completely prevents the practical attack even if support for DHE cipher suites is prioritized.

Updating the TLS specification to preserve leading zero bytes is impractical. In fact, experience shows that even deployment of new protocol features conforming to the existing specification is hard. This is because many implementations in the wild only implement a subset of the specification, often in a buggy way; see [12]. Since TLS 1.3 is not vulnerable to the attack by design, we propose to focus on the TLS 1.3 deployment rather than trying to update the old specification.

To prevent timing-based side channels in legacy applications with length-varying secrets, vendors must ensure that functions are implemented in constant time. This can be done as in the Lucky 13 mitigation or by computing the values for different fake parameters and discarding the fake ones afterwards. However, one has to be very careful when implementing such mitigations; previous research has shown that this kind of mitigations adds code complexity and may still leave the side channel open [5] or introduce even more severe vulnerabilities [61].

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A Exploiting $O^P$

Following Subsection 6.1 (see Figure 3), we now discuss mounting the attack using $O^P$, the Key Padding Oracle. To recap: The computation time of HMAC-SHA256 exhibits small “steps” when the input key length is $128 \cdot k - i, 1 \leq i \leq 8$. In particular, when using a 1024-bit (128 bytes) DH modulus, there is a measurable timing difference when the MSB is zero. Unlike previous oracles discussed in this work, this oracle allows attacking commonly-used modulus sizes, albeit at a much greater cost due to the smaller timing difference.

Our closer analysis revealed that this timing difference stems from the “finalize” function of the hash implementation. Figure 4 presents the (median) running time of this function for each input length. In broad terms, for inputs which are slightly shorter than a full block, the call to “finalize” must execute an additional internal call to the hash compression function. Contrast with Figure 5 which shows the running time of the “update” function; Figure 3 shows the

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Figure 4: Running time of the SHA-256 finalize function for inputs of varying lengths, measured in CPU cycles. Reported values are medians across 10,000 experiments per key length, performed with OpenSSL version 1.1.1.

Figure 5: Running time of the SHA-256 update function for inputs of varying lengths, measured in CPU cycles. Reported values are medians across 10,000 experiments per key length, performed with OpenSSL version 1.1.1.
total running time for computing HMAC-SHA-256, which includes both functions as internal calls, and therefore shows both step-like behaviors.

We repeated the calculation from Subsection 6.1 for this smaller side channel. With 1,000 samples per case (2,000 measurements overall), and a 20% false positive rate, the false negative rate is 7.72%.\textsuperscript{11} Increasing the number of measurements to 20,000 achieved a false positive rate of 0.004170% and a false negative rate of 0.012530%.\textsuperscript{12} Repeating the same calculation from Subsection 6.1, the attack therefore requires roughly 302 million handshakes with the target server in total (compared to 22 million handshakes when exploiting the easier case of exploiting $O^H$, as described in Subsection 6.1). These numbers are not necessarily optimal.

\textsuperscript{11}As before, we estimated these rates using 200,000 experiments.

\textsuperscript{12}We estimate these rates using 10 million sets of randomly-sampled 20,000 measurements. We further note that we configured the test with a false positive rate of 0.01%, but obtained a lower false positive rate. This could be an artifact of the approximations the test uses internally.